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In a multi-member arbitral tribunal it is not unusual fortwo or more members of the tribunal to know eachother and to have had or have close personal,
professional or other relationships. During a long
arbitration it is also possible for fellow arbitrators to
develop close relationships that remain throughout the
conduct of the arbitration and afterwards. Many
arbitrators are drawn from other professions and instances
arise where party-nominated arbitrators would have had
close professional relationships with the parties nominating
them giving rise to legitimate concerns as to their
independence and impartiality. Article 7 (1) of the ICC
Rules provides as follows:
Every arbitrator must be and remain independent of the
parties involved in the arbitration.
Prior and ongoing relationships with the parties might
affect the independence and, as a consequence, the
impartiality of arbitrators, and signal the need for careful
scrutiny of such relationships during the formation of the
arbitral tribunal. The rules of all arbitral institutions
provide for this in one way or another even though there is
rarely a reference to particular relationships as such
between the arbitrators and the parties to the arbitration.
In general, persons nominated as arbitrators sign a
declaration which includes a statement of their past and
present relationships with the parties to the dispute.
That is not surprising as most arbitrators are busy
professionals in other fields and it is not unusual for some
of them in the practice of their profession to have had
contact with the parties before their nomination as
arbitrators in a particular dispute involving the same
parties. The relevant point is the nature of their
relationships and current status and how far the arbitrators
can be trusted to be independent and impartial despite
previous and ongoing contacts with the parties. Although
arbitral institutions make a fuss about the relationships
with the parties, in practice none of them actually seriously
review their relationships and take appropriate action
except on a selective basis. Even if they do, the matter
becomes deeply controversial and leads often to allegations
against an activist arbitral institution of bias. Much of the
scrutiny is left to the parties themselves who may lodge
challenges to the appointment of someone as an arbitrator
compelling the appointing authority to make a final ruling.
Relationships between arbitrators themselves have rarely
been recognized as a meaningful factor in the conduct and
outcome of arbitrations probably because there is no
obvious link with their capacity to be impartial in any
particular dispute although their independence from each
other is questionable especially where the arbitrators are all
local or belong to the same arbitral entity and are involved
in a domestic arbitration. Yet relationships between
arbitrators abound and are much more common than
relationships with the parties in a dispute. Their
relationships inter se or, for that matter, absence of
relationships inter se can affect, if not the independence and
impartiality of the arbitrators, the pattern and intensity of
interaction between arbitrators in an arbitral panel and
impact directly on the quality of the adjudication process
and indirectly on the resulting award. However, the
Netherlands Arbitration Institute Arbitration Rules
(NAI)(2001) may be interpreted to mean that close
relationships between arbitrators can indeed affect their
impartiality. Article 10 (1) of the NAI Rules reads as
follows:
The arbitrator shall be impartial and independent. He may
not have a close personal or professional relationship with a
co-arbitrator or with any of the parties.
To equate the relationship of an arbitrator with any of
the parties with the relationship with a co-arbitrator is
unfortunate. If we were to be guided by the NAI Rules, the
fact that the relationship must be a close one will depend
on the circumstances and nature of each relationship to be
evaluated on a case by case basis. As to what is a
disqualifying close relationship between the arbitrators can
be different from what is a disqualifying close relationship
between an arbitrator and a party. Less strict criteria would
apply in the scrutiny of a relationship between an
arbitrator and a co-arbitrator. Is the relationship so close as
to make it obvious to the world at large that the two
arbitrators are not fit to serve on the same panel? This
would necessarily be the case where family relationships
exist or arbitrators belong to a partnership or other
business association having a common economic interest
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but not always as can be seen below. On the other hand,
one can argue justifiably that arbitrators who know each
other and belong to the same institutions will result in the
arbitral panel operating as a team with a common sense of
purpose and lead to a smooth and speedy less costly
arbitration.
Quite easily, however, close relationships between
arbitrators can lead unconsciously or consciously to shared
biases that can distort the conduct of the arbitration and
influence the correctness of the eventual award. The NAI
Rules have a good point which deserves serious attention
from other arbitral institutions and UNCITRAL.
Based on the NAI Rules, one would normally conclude
that two barristers belonging to the same chambers may
not be appointed as arbitrators in the same arbitration.
Unfortunately, the decision by Judge Rix in Laker Airways v
FLS Aerospace Ltd and Burnton et al to the effect that a party
nomination of a barrister as an arbitrator in an arbitration
in which the counsel for the party was a fellow barrister in
the same chambers was perfectly legitimate suggests
otherwise, at least according to English practice.
Where state parties are involved, an arbitral institution
such as the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), under Rule 1 of its
Arbitration Rules (2006), requires as follows:
The majority of the arbitrators shall be nationals of States
other than the State party to the dispute and of the State
whose national is a party to the dispute unless the sole
arbitrator or each individual member of the Tribunal is
appointed by agreement of the parties.
The ICC is also sensitive to the matter of nationality of
an arbitrator but only in the case of a sole arbitrator or
president of an arbitral tribunal and that too only in regard
to the parties to a dispute. The ICC Article 9 (5) reads as
follows:
The sole arbitrator or the chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal
shall be of a nationality other than those of the parties.
This is in line with Article 7(1) of the ICC Rules which
requires an arbitrator to remain independent of the parties
to the dispute. It is apparent that the ICC is not overtly
concerned about the close relationship between co-
arbitrators and their nationalities, but the ICC Rules
include a catch-all provision under Article 11 to the effect
that a challenge of an arbitrator may be made on grounds
of a “lack of independence or otherwise,” meaning that
there is no restriction on the range of circumstances that
can bring upon a challenge in an ICC administered
arbitration.
The rationale for the ICSID Rule and the ICC Rule (to
a lesser extent) in regard to nationalities of arbitrators is
unclear to me in this age of mass migrations, involuntary
transfers of peoples, and political and economic refugees
because nationality can often be a matter of accident and
convenience than choice. The fact remains that the
connection of an arbitrator with a party to the dispute or
more curiously with another arbitrator based on nationality
is a matter of concern to ICSID. Unfortunately, this rule
has effectively put arbitrators from the developing
countries out of ICSID arbitrations because arbitrators
from developing countries are rarely known outside their
own countries and state parties in ICSID arbitrations are
all developing countries except for the anomaly in Mobil
Corporation and others v New Zealand Government (ICSID Case
No ARB/87/2).
IS INTERACTION BETWEEN ARBITRATORS
AFFECTED BY THEIR RELATIONSHIPS?
There is the six million dollar question, especially in
international arbitrations, as to whether interaction
between arbitrators is affected adversely by relationships
between arbitrators and as to whether interaction is a
mandatory procedural requirement in arbitrations, and
whether evidence of a lack of reasonable interaction
between arbitrators or lack of reasonable attempts to
interact a ground for invalidation of an arbitral award.
By interaction, I mean consultations in good faith
between the arbitrators including the presiding arbitrator
in procedural matters and opportunities for reasonable
discussion and debate between all the members of the
arbitral panel including the presiding arbitrator before
decisions on substantive matters and the award are taken
and communicated to the parties. In a properly conducted
arbitration, there will also be many occasions when party
and other nominated arbitrators exchange ideas and views
among themselves, but consultations and exchanges
between the presiding arbitrator and the arbitrators should
be done in a manner that does not invite criticism of bias
on the part of the presiding arbitrator towards one or more
arbitrators in which case the independence of the presiding
arbitrator can be thrown into doubt and render any award
tainted.
The purpose in interaction is to discover the truth
through the contributions from all the arbitrators in a
panel. Truth is most likely to be discovered by exposure to
the scrutiny of those with varying views and standpoints
and their interaction in good faith in a rational and
reasonable manner, and it will be the duty of the presiding
arbitrator to ensure that the arbitration proceedings are so
conducted as to encourage the full participation of every
member of an arbitral tribunal in the whole arbitral process
leading to the making of the award. Past and present
relationships between the arbitrators can consciously or
unconsciously affect the perceptions of the arbitrators of
one another and, as a result their conduct towards one
another, raising questions as to the legitimacy of the
proceedings and quality of the award if they are unwilling
to interact effectively. 19
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The most conventional and common arbitral panel
consists of three arbitrators and the arbitral process begins
usually with the two parties in dispute nominating their
individual choice as arbitrators. The two party-nominated
arbitrators would then proceed to select and agree on a
third and presiding arbitrator. There is little risk of two
party-nominated arbitrators having close relationships
being nominated as arbitrators by the parties themselves.
Their nominations by the parties is unlikely to impact
negatively in the arbitral process unless one of the parties
is a state party and the parties have a joint corrupt motive,
but it is often possible that the presiding arbitrator has a
relationship with one of the party-nominated arbitrators
with potential for distorting or corrupting the process.
They could have worked together before, enjoy
connections with the same arbitral institutions in one form
or another (for example, official or corresponding
members of the ICC or AAA), be members of professional
arbitral bodies such as the London Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators, or be members of other professional bodies
such as the Institution of Civil Engineers and be listed by
these institutions in their own approved band of
arbitrators.
All these institutions encourage fellowship among their
members and many members pride themselves on the
closeness of their commitment to these institutions. These
institutions compete with each other for business and
some are overtly entrepreneurial in character. They mix
politics and business and engage in prejudicial conduct
where their interests are affected by blocking targeted
groups and individuals from joining the profession. On top
of this eager-beaver mix of competing arbitral institutions
and semi and quasi arbitral bodies, an arbitral panel can be
drawn from a mix of nationalities, cultures, religions and
legal systems with the result that at some point parties may
be faced with a panel formed of arbitrators with an uneasy
relationship inter se. It is unrealistic to think that an arbitral
tribunal is a collegial team “marked by power or authority
vested equally in each of a number of colleagues” unless
members of the tribunal are drawn from the same
institutions or have established successful personal or other
relationships – in which case their independence suffers
but arbitration rules are wrongly predicated upon the
belief that an arbitral tribunal is a collegial team. For that
reason, arbitration rules ignore the impact of close
relationships among arbitrators as a factor in their
appointment. In fact, the language of most arbitration rules
reflects the assumption underlying the conduct of an
arbitration that the panel members are all fellow members
of the same fraternity.
So much so, institutional arbitration rules refer generally
to the powers of the arbitral tribunal and the tasks that
have to be carried out by the tribunal and reference to
members of the tribunal, if at all, is made only in regard to
the making of the award. For example, Article 25 (1) of the
ICC Rules reads as follows:
When the Tribunal is composed of more than one arbitrator,
an Award is given by a majority decision. If there is no
majority, the Award shall be made by the chairman of the
Arbitral Tribunal alone.
Article 31 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
reads as follows:
When there are three arbitrators, any award or other decision
of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be made by a majority of the
arbitrators.
In both the ICC and UNCITRAL Rules there is
obviously an assumption that the president of the tribunal
must have included both co-arbitrators in a three-member
panel in the tribunal’s deliberations and that both co-
arbitrators would have been given an opportunity to
interact with the president in the deliberations and
reaching a conclusion on the award and preparing the
draft. In practice, the president or one of the co-
arbitrators would draft the award with the approval of the
president and invite the others to join in signing the award.
What the parties see is the award when it is finally printed
and presented to them. As to whether a party-nominated
arbitrator has been excluded effectively from all
deliberations and from reviewing the award, the parties will
not know except for a mandatory requirement under
Article 32 (4) of the UNCITRAL Rules for a note in the
award as to the reasons for the absence of the signature of
any one of the arbitrators. There is no guarantee that an
arbitral tribunal would have availed itself of the knowledge,
experience and expertise of all the members of the panel.
The ICC is concerned neither with the minority view nor
the absence of any signature.
By contrast to the ICC and UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, the ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 47 (3) recognizes
the presence of the third or minority arbitrators by
providing as follows:
Any member of the Tribunal shall attach his individual
opinion to the award, whether he dissents from the majority
or not, or a statement of his dissent.
And this too without the agreement of the majority or
approval of the presiding arbitrator who are bound by the
ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules to admit the
contribution of the minority or third arbitrator. It also
means that a minority or third member of an ICSID
Tribunal cannot be refused the right to review an award
made by the majority of the tribunal before it is
communicated to the parties to the dispute. The ICSID
Arbitration Rules, Rule 16(2) goes further and makes it
mandatory in any decision by correspondence among
members of the tribunal to be made only after consultation
with all members of the tribunal without exception:
Except as otherwise provided by these Rules or decided by the
Tribunal, it may take any decision by correspondence among
its members, provided all of them are consulted.20
Amicus Curiae Issue 68 November/December 2006
Although the presence of a majority of the members of
a tribunal is sufficient for a valid sitting of an ICSID
Tribunal, the fact remains that all the members should have
been notified and consulted, of the date of a hearing or
deliberations on any matter and the making of an award.
I return to the six million dollar question as to whether
interaction or attempts to interact between all the
arbitrators and the opportunity for review of the award by
all the arbitrators is a mandatory procedural requirement
for all arbitrations under both the UNCITRAL and ICC
Rules and indeed under other arbitral institution rules; and
as to whether the exclusion by the tribunal of an arbitrator
who is able and willing from the review of the award results
in invalidation of the award.
These situations seldom arise as the arbitral institutions
and the professional bodies through their propaganda and
subtle pressures tend to deter the parties from nominating
truly independent arbitrators other than those known and
approved by these institutions and professional bodies and
have close relationships with them and each other.
Professional relationships are common among lawyers and
arbitrators with large practices but by and large they learn
to respect the independence of each other. Close
relationships also develop and it would be unusual if
normal human beings do not relate to each other outside
their professions. Besides, as pointed above, national
arbitral bodies encourage the appointment of their
membership as arbitrators and professional associations
and arbitral institutions maintain panels of arbitrators
available for selection as arbitrators. Many of the successful
arbitrators know each other, have close professional and
personal relationships and actively promote the interests of
the arbitral entities to which they belong.
The arbitration rules as they presently stand have made
it possible for a three-member panel arbitration to be
conducted and the award made with minimum
participation of a member of the panel if the presiding
arbitrator and a co-arbitrator so decide. Although it is very
rare, it is also possible for a presiding arbitrator to be
ignored in the deliberations leading to an award if the co-
arbitrators so decide and are agreed on the contents of the
award. The majority generally has absolute power to
control the conduct of an arbitration and deliberations
afterwards if the majority so decides. Under the present
rules, there is no express mandatory requirement for
interaction of the all the arbitrators in the making of an
award although all arbitrators must be notified and
consulted on dates of tribunal deliberations. However,
there is nothing stopping a presiding arbitrator meeting
with one of the arbitrators with whom he has a close
relationship in informal exchanges including writing the
award. Arbitration rules do not regulate the procedures to
be adopted in the making and review of an award by an
arbitral tribunal to ensure that every member of the
tribunal puts in his bit to produce a quality product.
If there is a compelling reason to require an arbitrator
not to have a close relationship with a co-arbitrator, it lies
in the potential of such a relationship to discourage the
effective participation of the third arbitrator as, for
example, where the two arbitrators find it convenient to
ignore him and where they develop a hostility towards the
third arbitrator for good reasons or bad. It is only where
two arbitrators have a corrupt motive that their close
relationship can have a negative impact on the arbitration
and the validity and value of the award, but it can affect the
quality of the award. The NAI Rule does not distinguish
between professional and personal relationships and it
would be misleading to consider the NAI Rule as anything
other than a matter of policy to encourage new entrants to
the arbitration field. There is wide criticism that
international commercial arbitration is dominated by a
small group of practitioners promoted by the institutions
to which they belong.
It would be counter-productive if there were to be a
general rule excluding those with previous professional
relationships from appearing together in an arbitration, but
considering the failings of human beings every allegation of
relationship professional or otherwise between arbitrators
should be examined on a case by case basis, and
appropriate action taken by the competent authority.
Even though the rules of international arbitral
institutions mandate that arbitrators should be
independent of the parties to a dispute and give powers to
the institutions to refuse a nomination, the institutions
themselves seldom interfere in the choice of party-
nominated arbitrators in the interests of respect for party
autonomy and to avoid criticism of bias and prejudice on
the part of the institutions. A close relationship between
two arbitrators is all but ignored by the arbitral institutions.
This can be a serious matter in arbitrations under arbitral
rules such as the UNCITRAL Rules which give the parties
absolute freedom in the choice of arbitrators and where
there is no compulsory supervision by a reputable arbitral
institution. By contrast, the ICC supervising counsel
ensures that the award is reviewed by all the arbitrators
even though not so expressly required by its arbitration
rules and ICSID rules go further and invite arbitrators to
express their individual opinion on awards made by the
majority in a panel thus compelling the majority to share
with the minority in the making and review of the award.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ARBITRATORS
AND ARBITRATIONS INVOLVING STATE
PARTIES
The relationship between arbitrators is of particular
interest in arbitrations involving state parties. Many
international arbitrations involve developing countries,
usually in the capacity of the respondent. Although seldom
raised as an issue in international arbitrations, the general
malaise and misconduct in government institutions and
parastatal agencies in most developing countries must 21
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inevitably creep into the arbitral process too, with the
potential to corrupt an otherwise efficient and cost
effective alternative to the local courts of law. Damage to
the integrity of the arbitral process can occur where the
arbitrations of such disputes are governed by UNCITRAL
Rules without the supervision of a reputable arbitral body
such as the ICC and ICSID. I am convinced that the use of
UNCITRAL Rules without the supervision of an
international arbitral body should be discouraged in
arbitrations involving a state party because there is no
guarantee that the arbitral process will not be abused by
corrupt state officials and unethical private entrepreneurs.
Given that relationships between arbitrators and
between arbitrators and parties to a dispute do matter in an
arbitration, the combination key to a successful arbitration
in terms of a reliable quality award is (1) respect for party
autonomy, (2) the appointment of arbitrators who are
prepared to interact with their fellow arbitrators whoever
they are and from wherever they may originate, and (3) the
selection of a chairman under strict conditions requiring
that he or she ensures maximum interaction between the
arbitrators and full participation of all members of an
arbitral tribunal in its deliberations or else risk the
invalidation of the award in a court of law. As pointed out
above, a close relationship between two arbitrators can
affect the independence of arbitrators and the way in which
the arbitrators interact with arbitrators outside that
relationship. However, the respect for party autonomy will
ensure that co-arbitrators are relatively new to each other
without a close relationship and, as a result, without the
risk of collusion in pursuit of a corrupt motive.
Unfortunately, the focus on the person of an arbitrator and
fellowship among arbitrators by arbitral institutions and
professional bodies promoting their membership has
resulted in encouraging parties to engage in time
consuming practices in the nomination process and
making the formation of the arbitral tribunal a protracted
painful event. Exchange of lists of acceptable arbitrators
prepared by the parties and their counsel and the tactics
surrounding the preparation and scrutiny of the lists to
arrive at nomination of arbitrators acceptable to both
parties is an example of such practices.
Notwithstanding all the pretences that arbitration is a
cost-effective alternative to the courts of law, and many
arbitrators have been vetted by professional bodies, parties
see the normally simple task of nominating its choice as the
party-nominated arbitrator as the beginning of a battle
ostensibly to have a neutral impartial panel in place, but in
reality to get a panel which is likely to be the most favorable
to the party that wins its preferences. This extends to the
selection of the chairman of the tribunal which normally
should be a matter of agreement between the party
nominated arbitrators. Ideally, each party nominated
arbitrator would be as receptive as possible to the other’s
preference for the position of chairman of a tribunal
because neither considers himself (or herself) an advocate
to the party who nominated him to believe that his
colleague will be seeking to insist on his choice at any cost.
I also see the agreement among co-arbitrators on the
presiding arbitrator as the beginning of a mutually
respected professional relationship. Unfortunately, there is
a common belief that the selection of the right arbitrators
is the difference between one or the other party winning its
case. This cynical approach belies the pretence that
arbitration is a credible alternative to the courts of law.
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